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JANUARY  lQR3,  THE  RT  HON  ROY  JENKINS  MP  WILL  SAY: 
"  The  world  is descending  into the. deepest  slump 
for  SO  years.  And  without  a  reversal of  present policies 
all the  indications are that it will get worse.  Deflation 
is breeding protectionism,  and  each is feeding  upon  the 
other and  making  the outlook not merely bleak but menacing. 
If we  take no action,  present conditions may  in a  year or 
two's  time  make  today's ills seem almost benevolent.  We 
shall have  thrown  away  the whole  remarkable  achievement 
of  the quarter century  from  1948  to 1973,  which gave  the 
Western world  a  greater prosperity and  unity than it had 
ever  seen before. 
In these circumstances  there is an  immense  need for 
imaginative  and  constructive statesmanship.  Yet little 
has  so far been  forthcoming.  Western  leaders  have  either 
turned  inwards  and  concentrated upon  the  problems  of their 
own  countries,  with little regard to the  repercussive 
effects of their attempted remedies.  Or,  on the rare 
occasions  when  they  have  raised their eyes wider,  they 
have  lectured others to be more  restricti~e.  "Countries 
which  have overspent and  overborrowed must  reduce their 
spending  and  reduce  their borrowing"  the British Prime 
Minister said in November. 
Taken  in relation to one  country,  this may  sound 
good  disciplinary doctrine.  But  applied widely across 
the world,  particularly when  accompanied  by  creeping 
protectionism, it is a  recipe for  the generation of  a 
second great wave  of recession.  The  further deflation 
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of  overseas markets  can  spell nothing but  further  economic 
trouble.  Accompanied,  as it may  be,  by  the  financial 
dominoes  beginning  to knock  each other over,  it could  lead 
to  a  hitherto unprecedented disaster.  The  interests of 
the world  ec.onomy  as  a  whole  1  and  of  the United  States and 
the European  Community  as  economically crucial parts of 
the world,  are the  same:  to reject deflation and 
protectionism and  to. work  __ together for  expansion of 
world  trade  and  the revi  \tal:.:1 •  of growth  in our domestic 
economies. 
I  believe that this is the moment  for  the main 
trading countries  jointly to proclaim a  change of course. 
The  world  was  catapulted into slump  by  the  two  great oil 
crises,  and  by  the restrictive monetary policies with which 
governments  sought to contain the inflationary consequences. 
The  slump  has  been made  worse  by wildly fluctuating  exchange 
rates which  have  discouraged  the growth of  investment  and 
trade.  It is nonsense  to pretend that these fluctuations 
reflect reality.  They  do  nothing of  the  sort.  How  can 
they when  the yen  has  been  depressed while Japanese  exports 
have  been  sweeping  the world?  _ It is no  longer trade patterns 
which  set exchange rates.  It is, perversely,  exchange 
rates which  set trade patterns.  This  danger is intensified 
as  a  result of the  over-~xten4ed positions of many private 
banks  becau~e -~f -t._heir  in  __itsel~  desirab_i~ lending  to  he_avily 
indebted countries.  They  are  now  naturally less willing 
or able to continue to lend  and  the  supply of finance 
necessary to lubricate the wheels  of trade is being withdrawn. 
But circumstances are changing,  and  as  they  do  so  a 
window  of  opportunity for  effective concerted action emerges. 
The  oil price has  stabilised and is far more  likely to fall 
than to rise significantly in the foreseeable  future.  The 
,J;ate  of  inflation is d~clining around  the  world  and  interest 
rates have at least temporarily  come  down.  As  world-wide 
concern  about  unemployment mounts,  circumstances  have 
become  propitious for  an  international initiative to save 
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the world  from  the disaster which  continued  adherence  to 
previous  policies will bring.  Opinion is,  I  believe,  turning 
here  in the United  States.  Monetary targets  are effectively 
abandoned.  ~here are increasing  numbers,  including  some  in 
influential places,  who  see  the fight against inflation, 
while  in itself necessary,  as  an  inadequate_~xclusive goal 
of  economic  policy.  Concern is also rising in Germany  as 
unemployment  goes  over  two million even  there.  We  should 
seize this moment,  now at the beginning  of  1983,  to halt 
the Gadarene  rush  towards protection  a~d  launch-inst~ad  . 
. a  carefully wor~~ed-out,  responsible,  but above all coordinated 
strategy for  expansion of  the world.economy. 
Such  coordinated action will be  required  on  three 
fronts  : 
First,  joint expansion.  If countries are successfully 
to expand,  it is highly  desirabld~ that they should  do  so 
together.- Otherwise,  if one  country makes  a  solitary "dash 
ior growth")  its expansion is likely to be  abruptly ended 
by balance of  payment difficulties and  the inflationary 
pressures which  follow  from  a  ~ollapsing exchange rate. 
Coordinated  expansion is far more  easily sustainable.  It was 
planned  for  at the  Bonn  Economic  Summit  in July 1978,  in which, 
as  President of  the European Commission,  I  participated together 
with  the heads.of  government of  the  seven  Sw~it nations.  There, 
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following/expansionary  moves  by  both the United States and 
Britain,  Japan  undertook  to raise its growth rate by  1.5%. 
Germany  in turn took  action to raise its GNP  by  1%.  And 
France,  Italy and  Canada all undertook to make  contributions 
of  their  own. 
The  conventional view  is that this exercise was  misconceived 
But this is a  superficial view without considering the reason why it 
did  notachieve  a  sustained drive  to its objectives.  It was  quite 
simply aborted  by  the  second oil crisis, which  ushered in the 
general  move  towards  restrictive policies  and  carried us all 
into the great slump.  That  lion is  no  longer  in the path, 
and  shows  no  sign of returning.  The  rationale of  Bonn  remains 
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valid,  and  my  first proposal  is that  now  there  should be 
a  major political effort to revive it.  Relatively small 
adjustments  to the fiscal  stance of  the major  countries 
involved  could produce  significant increases in GNP  and 
-reductions in unemployment.  The  world  could gradually 
be  led out of recession by  imaginative decisions  such 
as  Keynes  propounde?  andyoo~eveit took. 
There  is  no  contradiction  between  concern  to  correct  the 
medium  term  ''full  employment  deficit''  and  a  willingness  to 
apply  some  short-term  stimulus  in  conditions  well  short  of  full 
employment. 
Second,  monetary stability.  Coordinated expansion 
will not succeed upless  exchange.rates are given a  reasonable 
~  stabili~~~- If they are allowed to fluctuate wildly and:often 
irrationally,  they become  the  enemy_ of world  trade and of 
international investment.  TheYalso  stimulate protectionist 
forces  in those countries whose  currencies  are forced  too 
high.  But we  should hot be  utopian.  The  economic 
performance of countries inevitably varies  in terms of 
growth  in productivity and  comparative inflation.  We  cannot 
therefore just proclaim a  new  regime  of fixed  exchange rates 
and  expect it to stick.  The  simple  re-establishment of the 
Bretton Woods  system of fixed rates,  great though were  the 
benefits which  flowed  from it, is not  a  practical option 
today.  Apart from  anything  ~lse,  the United  States 
discovered in 1971  that it could  no  longer  sustain the 
solar role in this  system which it had  so  honourably 
discharged for  27  years. 
Yet  there is mounting disillusionment with freely-
floating currencies.  Experience of  these has  not been that 
they adjust gradually  and  smoothly,  keeping  payments  in 
balance.  On  the contrary,  exchange rates have  lurched 
wildly  from  one  extreme  to another  - in the  US/British case 
from  a  pound/dollar rate of 1.60 to  2.40  and  back again. 
And  not  only have  they been unstable,  but they have  shown 
a  capacity to stay well out of  line  ~ in terms  of relative 
inflation competitiveness  and  balance  of  payments -.for long 
periods.  The  pound  is  oyer~valu~d by  a  good  30%  compar~d,wit~ 
its  1975  level.  The  dollar  has  been  so  by  about  the  same  amount  -
although  less  so  today  than  a  month  ago.  The  yen  ~s  at  least  12% 
down  from  its  rational  level.  In  Britain's  case,  the  result  has 
been  to  destroy  competitiveness  and  accelerate  de-industrialisation. 
In  the  case  of  the  United  States,  the  effect  has  been  to  re~e 
long  dormant  protectionist  instincts. 
/  The  markets The  markets  themselves  cannot  and  do  not  ensure 
that currencies adjust to reality so as  to keep  foreign 
payments  in balance  and  employment  reasonably full.  \\That 
is required is a  system of  exchange rates which broadly 
maintains  the competitive position of  one  econ?my_against 
another ·and avoids  the short-term fluctuatfcm's  which are 
damaging  to trade and  devastating to investment decisions • 
•  :  .- _A; 
-I  believe that substantial progress  could be made 
on  a  trilateral basis between  the us,  the members  of the 
European Monetary  System,  which  should ever more  opviously 
include Britain,  and ·Japan.  Each  bloc would  define a· 
"target zone"  for its currency within which the·value 
would  be free-to vary.  This_should,  in present circum-
stances,  be wider'than the old Bretton Woods  margins. 
:?erha~s the  6%-maroins  which  the Italian lira has within 
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the  m:.s  would  be  reasonable. - From  tirr:e  to time the 
central ra'tes would  be  shift_ed  upwards  -~-i:  _sqwn~ards. 
according to mediurr.-ter~_  cha!lg~~- i_~- reiciff.ye_-c9~petitiveness, 
\Jhich would  embrace  inflation differentials.  Monetary policy 
would  be  used  to keep  the rates within the  zones.  They  should 
not be permitted to go  outsid~ in response  to  sp~culative 
movements  or short-term factors.  Adequate  swap  agreements, 
which  are not difficult to secure,  can  iron out disruptive 
short~terrn waves,  although  they cannot  - nor  should  they -
obviate the need. for  responding to a  long-term swell of the 
ocean. 
The  new  tripod would  form  the basis of  a  new,  stable; 
but not rigid international monetary  system.  It would  be 
possible and  desirable for  other countries  strongly dependent 
on  one or other of  the blocs  to tie their currencies to the 
dollar,  yen or European  ECU.  To  take European  examples,  the 
Austrian schilling and  the  S\vedish  krone  would obviously 
move  in  general  with  the  ECU. 
Third,  finance for  the  developing world.  The risk of 
a  knock-on collapse of  the  banking  system cannot be ignored.rt  15 
of  course  not  certainlt should  not be  exaggerated.  But it is 
chere.  And  increased risks mean  that private financial - 6  -
lenoing  is being  much  reduced.  If the  expansionary 
strategy outlined  above  is put  into operation,  and  growth 
as  a  result 
rates in.the industrialised world raised/by  an  average 
annual rate of about  1%,  World  Bank  estimates  suggest 
that large increases in the  flows. of  bo~~ official and 
"private finance  to developing countries would  be  needed if 
general sustained expansion were not to be frustrated by 
.  . 
credit  const~nts.  Tnere~should be at least a  doubling 
of International Monetary  Fu~d quotas  and  a  fresh issue 
of Special Drawing.Rights- preferably angled in favour  of 
developing countries;  and  there  should be  a  major extension 
of  "co-financing",  which means  close cooperation between  the 
official institutions and  private banks. 
The private banks  need sufficient confidence to 
continue  lending  on  the scale required.  This  means  help with 
debt servicing for  those developing countries  whose  total 
exports barely cover their  i~terest charges.  It means  support 
for  the  new  $20 billion IMF  fund  for use  in cases  like the 
recent one of Mexico.  Thii is not soft-hearted generosity. 
It is imaginative self-interest for  the Western world  such as 
was  spectacularly  shown  by  the United States at the  time of 
the Marshall Plan which  led to the most  economically 
successful years  in the recorded history of  the world.  It 
also led to the most  freely accepted period of  unchallenged 
American  leadership of the West  and  of much  of  the rest of 
the world  as well.  That cannot be wholly recreated in its 
old form.  The  past can rarely be set upon its throne again. 
Leadership must  now  come  from  both sides of the Atlantic 
and  the United States  and  the European  Community  must be 
careful not to let their trade differences  undermine  the 
necessary political partnership. 
The first two  proposals  would  provide  a  context within 
which  expansion could restart - measured,  balanced,  sustainable 
expansion  - and  the third would  ensure that it would  not run 
into a  barrier of markets blocked by·  penury.  The  essentials 
are more  stable currencies  and  a  world of good  neighbours. 
/A far-sighted 
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A  far-sighted  recognition  of  interdependence  served  us  far  too 
well  in  the  days  of  mounting  prosperity,  which  did  not  start 
easily,  for  us  to  turn  our  back  on  it  in  the  harsher  circumstances 
of  today.  They  are  the  keys  which  will  unlock  the  gate  of  escape 
from  the  threatening  dungeo~ of  deflation  and  protectionism. 
They  alone  can  once  again  give  us  the  realistic prospect  of  restorin~ 
jobs  growth  and  the  expansion  of  trade. 
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